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American Reform Efforts: 
German Professional Education after World War II 
 
Charles E. McClelland 
University of New Mexico 
 
[Later published in Jürgen Heideking, Mark Depaepe and Jurgen Herbst (eds.), Mutual 
Influence on Education: Germany and the United States in the Twentieth Century, Paedagogica 
Historica, New Series, 33 (1997), 265-75.] 
 
In 1945, German professionals faced the same suspicion and 
hostility as other elites of defeated National Socialist 
Germany. Judges and lawyers had betrayed legal norms common to 
the civilized world; Nazi physicians had carried out sadistic 
experiments; German chemists and engineers had supplied Zyklon-B 
to the Holocaust death camps; teachers had inculcated obedience; 
and pastors had sanctified the regime. Had all professionals 
been corrupted by their forced organizational "Nazification" 
after 1933? Could one trust them? 
Almost a half-century later, a history of German 
professions from 1900 to 1950 stresses the "corrosion of German 
professionalism" and attributes it to "a separation from its 
liberal roots."i Another equally recent study of German jurists 
laments the hollowing-out of the liberal core of German law 
under Nazi rule: "The resulting damage has made itself felt in 
the intellectual climate of German jurisprudence up to the 
present day, and has proven to be one of the most lasting 
inherited defects."ii 
Such judgments may be disputable, but they rest largely on 
hindsight. Considering that the Allied victors of 1945 started 
with similar suspicions of professional (as well as other) 
elites and announced ambitious, in some cases sweeping policies 
aimed at making them over into serviceable instruments of 
reconstruction, we might well wish to compare their intentions 
(foresight) with the judgments of the results (hindsight) 
mentioned above.  The four powers differed considerably in the 
way they carried out their views, however. While referring to 
the other three occupying powers, this paper will focus mainly 
on the American. As the richest, most powerful and most 
influential power,  its attempts at professional reform deserve 
special interest. 
 
This chapter will limit itself to an exploration of 
educational reform and specifically to three areas in which the 
American occupation influenced the shape of professional 
education in the 1940s and beyond. First, it will briefly cover 
the effects of denazification. Second, it will examine the way 
in which American professional organizations expressed their 
concern about defects in German professional education, and what 
effects such concern had in Germany. Finally, it will address 
the way in which American occupation authorities dealt with the 
equivalents of U.S. professional organizations in Germany, since 
they had all had very concrete agendas for educational reform 
before the Third Reich.  
 
First and most immediately, denazification processes 
reduced the sheer number of professional practitioners even 
below the decimated level already caused by Nazi policies and 
war losses. The opportunity of rapidly training replacements was 
severely limited by the same processes applied to the teaching 
staff of universities and technical colleges.  
The history of denazification is relatively well-known and 
need not take up limited space here. It is important to note, 
however, that this "personnel policy" (or rather succession of 
policies) set important conditions and limitations on any chance 
for other reforms of professional education. The initial wave of 
dismissals and purges of Nazi party members produced severe 
shortages of trained personnel allowed to function in 
professional capacities, as well as in the higher educational 
institutions that were obliged to train the next generation. 
This was one of many "crisis phenomena" that reduced the chances 
for fundamental structural reform in the first few years of the 
occupation.  
 
To put this another way: the Nazis had already greatly 
undermined the integrity of most professions, snatching back in 
many cases their promise of "reprofessionalization" once the war 
was on. (This promise had formed one of the most alluring 
"appeals of fascism" to professionals in 1933 who could 
otherwise not be reached by Nazi ideology.) Manpower shortages 
during  the war led to the steady erosion of university teaching 
and study, just as university buildings were victims of heavy 
war damage; and of course the Nazis left Germany bankrupt. This 
situation would have been crisis enough to overcome in 1945; but 
the initial and rather hasty, ill-thought-out "denazification" 
prevented all extremes of party members, from hard-case fanatics 
to timid Mitläufer or so-called Karteigenossen, from teaching or 
exercising most other learned professions.  
 
At the beginning of the Allied denazification process, 
personnel deficits (for example in university and technical 
college faculties) were made up in part by bringing back retired 
personnel. These were in some cases men (hardly any women) who 
had been forced out by the National Socialist regime; but in 
most cases they were just old. People who had already served 
under the Weimar Republic and returned to office with the 
implicit assumption that they should carry on as before 1933 
were hardly the most likely candidates for the role of fiery 
reformer.  By the time Allied denazification processes had 
stopped (as in the Soviet Zone by 1947) or been radically 
modified (as in the American Zone), many persons with dubious 
pasts had now been allowed to resume their careers, thus solving 
some of the manpower shortage at the cost of reinstalling 
persons who were also unlikely to be on the forefront of calls 
for major changes in the way professional education was handled. 
(It is worth noting that the Soviet Zone carried out both the 
most radical purge of Nazis as well as the most radical 
restructuring of professional education and the British perhaps 
the least in both areas.)  
 
Although the American occupation brought with it 
initiatives for educational reform, these appear to have been 
pyramidal in shape: the lower the level of education, the 
greater the American interest. This chapter is based only on the 
most preliminary sifting of the evidence, but that indicates a 
pattern of pragmatism and ad-hoc decisions regarding higher 
education, not a well-thought out plan for reform brought to 
Germany along with Jeeps and C-rations. The impressive recent 
collection edited by Gary Tsushimochi, The U.S. Occupation of 
Germany: Educational Reform, 1945-1949, for example, contains 
over 1600 documents, almost none of which deals extensively with 
the reform of professional education.iii  American concerns about 
and tangible contributions to higher education, such as studium 
generale or exchange programs, could usually be described as 
belonging to the "undergraduate" level.  
 
 
In comparing the negative and positive "reform efforts" 
carried out initially under American occupation auspices in the 
universities, however, one can readily see that the former 
(denazification) was much easier to undertake than the latter. 
But let us examine briefly whether the occupation authorities 
could find blueprints for professional education reform supplied 
by such organizations as the American Medical and Bar 
Associations or similar associations of engineers or teachers. 
What does a preliminary survey of the American professional 
press during and immediately after the Second World War 
indicate? 
 
As Duke University medical Professor Wilburt Davison 
reported, after touring German medical schools in the summer of 
1945, they had "not kept pace with the advances in medicine" and 
German physicians were "poorly trained."iv Unfortunately, he also 
reported, most German medical professors were unwilling to 
acknowledge these charges or the need for significant reform. 
Davison argued that there were too many students, period, and 
also too many for the limited clinical and laboratory 
facilities. But a reduction in student numbers would have 
reduced the lecture fee income of the professors, whose own 
economic interests, he implied, militated against reform.v 
 
Davison's own preference was fairly clear and is worth 
citing in full because it shows no lack of understanding on the 
part of American educators about the need for sweeping reforms 
in professional education : 
 
Complete denazification and reform with active 
American participation: Complete denazification of the 
university; rigid selection of students; 
reorganization of the curriculum to introduce 
laboratory and bedside teaching in place of the 
current lecture system; establishment of a uniform, 
short, practical final examination to replace the 
time-consuming staatsexamen; the payment of adequate 
teaching salaries with the university retaining all 
student fees; provision of supplements to German 
libraries and laboratories from American sources, and 
sponsorship of each opened German medical school in 
the U.S. zone by some American medical school, which 
probably, if invited, would rotate some of its faculty 
members to the German school so that modern teaching 
methods could be established and maintained.vi 
 
Somewhat cryptically, he predicted that this plan would prove 
impractical, however, both because German cooperation was 
uncertain and unspecified American and Allied "sources" might 
react adversely.vii The plan favored by those "sources," he 
claimed, was "complete denazification without reform," that is 
"without reorganization of the curriculum, except for the 
elimination of Nazi ideology and of dangerous research 
activities."viii This was, in other words, the plan of the military 
authorities. Finally, the plan preferred by the German medical 
faculties was, according to Davison, "limited denazification 
without reform," or the removal only of personnel actually 
arrested by the authorities or removed by internal university 
committees.ix 
 
These comments are even more interesting when one realizes 
they were gathered on an information trip sponsored by the 
medical authorities of the U.S. Control Group (Germany), in the 
company of such influential occupation-era educational advisors 
as Edward Hartshorne.  
 
Almost three years later, another report on medical 
education in Germany, this time commissioned by the U.S. Surgeon 
General, still found it wanting in four out of five areas: well-
trained  faculty; suitable clinical and hospital facilities; 
adequate equipment and supplies for teaching laboratories; and a 
"well-selected student body." Only in the fifth area -- 
providing an adequate volume and variety of sick patients -- was 
Germany doing extremely well!x Even with a numerus clausus for 
medical study, perhaps half the university students were 
entering medicine, the author of this 1948 report speculated, 
mostly because many medical students were allocated extra 
rations above the 1500-calorie daily level.xi 
 
With the easing of denazification strictures by 1948, one 
could conclude that the third of Davison's "alternatives", 
"limited denazification with no reform," had become the reality 
under American occupation, as least as far as medical education 
was concerned.  
 
American attitudes toward reform in the legal profession 
appear also to have relied more heavily on denazification than 
educational change. Draconically, all German courts were closed 
at the beginning of the Occupation, with up to 90% of all legal 
personnel losing their jobs.xii Attempts to reopen courts from 
mid-1945 on proved difficult when not enough trained jurists 
with clean political records could be found even to staff the 
bench, and many of these were retirees in their 70s and older. 
Instead of employing hastily and badly trained "people's 
judges," as in the Soviet Zone, the western Allies gradually 
relaxed strictures against all but the highest-level former 
NSDAP party members and office-holders (this was achieved 
especially in the American zone by the mechanism of amnesties), 
so that the required legal personnel could be largely drawn from 
what remained of the Third Reich's personnel (including numerous 
refugees from the east).xiii The final twist to this story was the 
restoration of the rights of pre-1945 civil servants, including 
judges and state's attorneys, in West Germany during the 1950s. 
 
Did the American occupation authorities treat the German 
legal profession in a way significantly different from the 
expectations of their American professional colleagues? Judging 
by the relatively small body of literature reflecting the 
latter, it did not. The consensus American legal opinion appears 
to have been that, while German legal practice had been badly 
distorted by the imposition of Nazi ideology, extraordinary 
courts, over-harsh punishments, and practices contravening 
international standards, these had not penetrated very deeply 
into the legal profession! High and basically sound standards of 
legal training before 1933 were thought to have been the norm. 
The fact that a complete legal education (including post-
university training) normally required up to 13 years, and the 
thousand-year Reich had only lasted 12, prompted some to argue 
that there were, strictly speaking, no German lawyers trained 
entirely under the Nazis. Others pointed out the fact that very 
few young men had been allowed to continue to study law once the 
war had begun (three years at the front being the condition for 
returning to study).xiv In any case I could find no published 
demands in American legal circles for a thoroughgoing reform of 
legal education in Germany.  
 
Considering the keen American emphasis on "re-education," 
one would expect a much different attitude toward the reform of 
the teaching profession in Germany. Indeed, the occupation 
authorities were also at pains to eliminate suspected Nazis from 
teaching posts, even though this led to terrible overcrowding in 
classrooms; and they were in principle interested in reforming 
the ideological training of teachers, especially those in the 
Volksschule and Realschule. In practice, however, the teacher 
training system found in the American occupation area in 1945 
was largely left intact, once Nazi elements had been removed and 
the Weimar "essence" restored. Also in practice this meant no 
further steps toward "professionalizing" the training of lower 
and mid-school teachers by promoting university-level education 
for them -- one of the unfulfilled professionalizing desiderata 
of the more important Weimar teachers' professional 
organizations. 
The professional press of American teachers before and 
immediately after the end of the war (like the ordinary American 
press) carried many articles on "German education after the 
war," but almost all of these addressed issues of 
"democratization" and school reform below the level of 
professional training. (One even made the plea that America 
should democratize its own schools before trying to do so in 
Germany!).  
 
Finally, combing the professional press of American 
engineering yielded practically no expressions of concern for 
the reform of technical professional training. The focus 
appeared rather, both before and after the end of hostilities, 
on a suspected superiority of German engineering and how, after 
1945, it could be harnessed to America's interests. The 
expropriation of German "technical capital" (such as in the U.S. 
rocket program) is a vivid indication of the degree to which 
American engineers were more impressed by the need to learn from 
Nazi Germany than to introduce radical reforms into German 
technical colleges.  
 
In a third area, an important set of clues to the 
expectations of the American occupation authorities regarding 
professional educational reform may be gleaned from American 
treatment of German professional organizations. Long before the 
end of World War II, such U. S. professional organizations as 
the American Medical and Bar Associations had a profound and 
certainly not-to-be-ignored voice in most matters affecting the 
shaping of American professions. How were their German 
equivalents approached for possible reform ideas? 
 
Because the German equivalents had been gleichgeschaltet, 
and not simply abolished and forbidden outright, understandable 
doubt existed in the Allied occupation authorities' minds about 
the akademische Berufsverbände. Of course all those extant in 
1945 were dissolved by all four powers as organizations 
affiliated with the Nazi Party, e.g. the NSRB (National 
Socialist Judges League), the NSÄB (National Socialist 
Physicians League) or the NSLB (National Socialist Teachers 
League). It did not appear to matter to the Allies whether the 
German professional associations already extant in 1932 had 
subsequently been abolished or forcefully absorbed in Nazi ones: 
all professional associations were prohibited by the Allies at 
first. They remained prohibited for the most part in the Soviet 
zone; at the opposite extreme, the British were the first to 
drop their suspicions and promote the reestablishment of 
professional organizations, at least in their own zone.  
The American authorities, however, had an additional reason 
for opposing professional organizations. They obviously were 
pinning their hopes on the alternative organizational model of 
labor unions to embrace professional workers and, in a broader 
sense, bring democratic ideas to all employed Germans at their 
workplace. The Americans were on solid historical ground in one 
sense: labor-union types of professional organization had 
already established themselves on German soil during and, 
incipiently, even before the Weimar Republic, although they had 
held limited appeal. In one very notable case, this American 
expectation met with success -- the GEW (Union for Education and 
Science). Still, it is ironic that the British zonal authorities 
-- operating under a radical Labor government -- chose to allow 
the non-union form of professional association, while the 
increasingly anti-leftist Americans preferred to push unions.  
Thus reforms in such areas as curriculum, examinations and  
educational qualifications, in which the professional 
associations had played a noticeable role at least before the 
Hitler era, were undertaken by the American occupiers (if at 
all) without consulting those organizations.  
Whatever their reasons, the American authorities' initial 
hostility to professional associations meant that the German 
professions had no real way of articulating reform ideas, 
including progressive ones. (Presumably anti-democratic and Nazi 
ideas would have been banned in any case.)  
 
What tentative conclusions may we draw from this admittedly 
preliminary survey of American ideas about reforming German 
professional education?  
 
(1) Especially in the light of today's assumptions about 
how the public in Allied countries felt about the evils of 
National Socialism, it is surprising how, during the war and 
immediate post-war years, relatively little public discussion 
found its way into the American professional press, either of 
the horrors of Nazification or of the pressing need to change 
the nature and structure of German post-Abitur education. 
Instead, there was a wide agreement that the damage Nazism had 
done was probably not permanent and could be eliminated largely 
by personnel policies, chiefly the denazification of the 
professoriate and student body. Regard for pre-1933 professional 
training remained high, and faith in the basic soundness of 
those older structures and traditions was pronounced. The German 
professions and their educational underpinnings were viewed more 
as victims than as breeding-grounds of Nazism.  
 
(2) Even when the American professional press or special 
evaluating groups visiting Germany called for major changes in 
professional education -- as with medicine -- these tended to be 
more of a quantitative than qualitative nature. If German 
medical training needed to be reformed, for example, then more 
because it was perceived as "behind" rather than because medical 
schools had incidentally produced the largest percentage of a 
pre-1933 profession sympathetic to the Nazis. (Reform 
suggestions also sometimes reflected little more than 
ethnocentric preferences, for example for the "hospital" 
centered training of American and British medicine vs. the 
"lecture-hall" centered traditions of Germany.) 
 
(3) Whatever the thoughts and suggestions of American 
professionals may have been, there is not much evidence that 
they were put into practice by the American occupation 
authorities. Denazification was all by itself a sufficiently 
formidable task for the occupation authorities; the goal of 
maintaining a minimal operating level in such institutions as 
universities, another desideratum of the American occupiers, 
pulled them in the other direction, even if the temperature-drop 
of the deepening Cold War and the quiet resistance of most 
Germans (including surprisingly many exiles from Hitler's Third 
Reich) had not also been forces pushing the same way. Lack of 
qualified personnel and other resources to oversee the 
restructuring of the higher educational system is obvious to 
anybody who studies this period. Under these circumstances, 
could the occupation authorities have undertaken sweeping 
reforms, even if the will to do so had been more strongly in 
evidence? 
 
In this context, comparisons to British and French policy 
are instructive: despite the centralizing and active role of the 
French and the rather more "fraternizing" and hands-off stance 
of the British, the policies of all three Western occupying 
powers concerning university reform were quite comparable. The 
costs of reform from the ground up, administratively and in 
terms of financial support, were obviously too high to 
contemplate. 
 
(4) If one can speak of a "restoration" in West German 
professional training and, more broadly, university life after 
1945, it would appear to have fit in largely with the attitudes 
both of American professionals and the American occupation 
authorities. Far from seeing the Weimar professions and 
professional faculties producing "illiberal men," American 
professionals held them in surprisingly high regard and, even 
before the Germans themselves could claim to be "victims of 
Hitler," largely ascribed this role to their enemy colleagues.  
 
(5) In a broader sense,"reeducation" or schooling in 
democratic virtues, another American concern, reflected more an 
interest in mass education than training at the top: in no way 
for which I can find significant  evidence did the Americans 
advocate diluting the elite nature of tertiary (that is, for all 
intents and purposes, professional) education to achieve 
"democratization." It was more concerned with what values 
occupied the minds of this reformed elite. Despite the GI Bill, 
which really began to "democratize" American higher education at 
this time, at least on the college level, there was no 
perceptible concern to export the idea of expanded higher-
educational opportunity to occupied Germany. (If anything, 
overcrowding was the concern.) 
 
 
The absence of a documentary trail of a comprehensive 
reform program for German higher education does not, of course, 
prove that Americans had little or no impact. What they did -- 
with or without an overall plan -- surely had an impact and 
helped shape the system. Indeed, someday there will be a chance 
to compare their actions with those of the Federal Republic in 
the Neue Bundesländer after the GDR's "Stunde Null," and it 
would not be surprising to find the American record on real 
reform a strong one in comparison.  
 
Historians are used to "the irony of reform." What is 
intended rarely comes out as hoped by those in a position to 
effect changes. Given the financial, administrative, global-
ideological, domestic political, and physical constraints on the 
American occupation authorities and their charges, German 
universities and technical colleges, among others, it is 
difficult to see how radical reforms could have been carried 
out. Even more clearly, however, there was no vocal constituency 
in the USA to force democratic attention to such reforms of 
professional education. American engineering journals, for 
example, were much too busy pointing out the absurdity of the 
Morgenthau Plan -- which threatened the very idea of 
professional technical education in Germany -- to insist on a 
radical reform of that education.  
 
We should perhaps better think of the "irony of non-reform" 
and the laying of a foundation for a "restoration" of Weimar 
professional training without the disruptions, along with an 
injection of "democratization" and other environmental factors 
(such as prosperity and security) between 1945 and the 1960s. On 
these "American" foundations, reform would later be debated and 
carried out.  
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